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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
JULIO I. MARTINEZ 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20110015-CA 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Martinez responds to the State's arguments by contending that 1) he 
properly marshaled all facts relevant to the trial court's decision, 2) that the trial court 
failed to adequately inquire into the nature of the conflict between Mr. Martinez and 
his counsel mid-trial, and 3) that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest with 
him, which would mandate a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT PROPERLY MARSHALED THE FACTS 
In its brief, the State contends that defendant failed to properly marshal the 
facts surrounding the trial court's decision. Alpe's Br. at 25-29. However, at no point 
in the State's brief does it cite a fact that defendant did not mention in his brief. In 
fact, defendant fully marshaled all of the facts involving the trial court's decision. The 
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State acknowledges that the defendant recited "numerous facts" but claims they were 
not fully marshaled. Aple's Br. at 26. 
The State first claims that the defendant failed to properly marshal the trial 
court's findings on pretrial motions. Aple's Br. at 26-27. However, this argument fails 
appreciate the substance of defendant's argument. Defendant did not allege that the 
trial court erroneously decided the pretrial motions. Rather, he contended that the 
trial court, when faced with concrete allegations of an actual conflict of interest mid-
trial, failed to properly inquire into, and resolve, those conflicts.1 Aplt's Br. at 29-31. 
The State actually acknowledges the substance of the defendant's complaint— 
that mid-trial "the court did summarily reject" Mr. Martinez's complaint. Aple's Br. at 
27 (emphasis added). While it is true that the defendant raised a conflict with counsel 
pre-trial, the court appears to have properly heard and addressed those complaints. 
But when new allegations were raised mid-trial, specifically that his counsel now felt 
intimidated by Mr. Martinez, had made poor strategic decisions, and now felt that 
their ability to fully represent Mr. Martinez was compromised, the court "summarily 
rejected]" not the original pretrial motion, but these new arguments based on newly-
alleged facts. This is the essence of Mr. Martinez's argument. In fact, the pretrial 
motions shed little light on the issues the trial court faced mid-trial. In short, the 
1
 The State acknowledged defendant only argued the impropriety of the mid-trial 
motion in his initial brief. Aple's Br. at 27 n. 7. 
o 
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defendant fully marshaled the facts as to the allegations mid-trial, but did not feel the 
pretrial denials were erroneous under those circumstances. 
Second, the State seems to imply that defendant did not marshal the facts about 
the court's mid-trial inquiry when he claimed defense counsel felt "extremely 
threatened," but when he omitted one of the court's statements that the State 
interprets to mean that "no actual threats were involved, only intimidation." Aplt's Br. 
at 28. This claim misconstrues the court's statement and, of its own right, omits 
several pages of context in the record. 
As articulated in several pages of defendant's opening brief, the court 
repeatedly discovered that defense counsel felt "extremely threatened" by Mr. 
Martinez to the point that, by defense counsel's own admission, it compromised their 
"ability to continue to adequately and zealously represent Mr. Martinez in trial." Aplt's 
Br. at 9-12; R. 344:7. In fact, the court found that the intimidation had led defense 
counsel "to do things that would otherwise be against your professional judgment." 
Aplt's Br. at 10 (citing R. 344:7). The State omitted to reference the prosecutor's 
argument to the court that if "there have been actual threats of harm directed toward 
[defense counsel, then] I would have a duty to investigate that...." R. 344:9. The court 
claimed the State's concerns were "a whole different issue." R. 344:9. The prosecutor 
disagreed, saying that "legitimate threats of harm" were different from intimidation. 
R. 344:9. She asked to discuss this with defense counsel, at which point the court said, 
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"My sense right now ... is that it's more of the latter of the intimidation, but that's not 
the point." R. 344:9. The court did not find, as the State claims, that these matters 
involved mere intimidation. The court's "sense" was that the matter involved only 
intimidation, but at no point did the court fully inquire into and resolve that issue. 
This goes to the heart of Mr. Martinez's complaint—the trial court never inquired into 
the problem, even when asked by the State to do so, because it claimed that resolution 
of that issue did not matter. 
The State also claims that Mr. Martinez "acknowledges but does not properly 
marshal" his own actions which justified the court's finding. Aple's Br. at 28 (emphasis 
added). Particularly, the State argues that Defendant's inconsistent arguments about 
counsel's communication, a severance motion, withdrawl of the substitution request, 
and stare-down somehow were not properly marshaled. Aple's Br. at 28-29. 
Unfortunately, it is unclear to Mr. Martinez how his inconsistencies somehow relate 
to his argument. As the State acknowledges, Defendant raised all of these issues as part 
of his brief. Aple's Br. at 28. None of these issues, assuming their truth, affects the 
court's responsibility to inquire into the nature of the conflict. Defendant came into 
court for his second day of trial and was surprised by this "new" information that his 
attorneys feared him and had spoken with the presiding judge about the problem. R. 
344:15. The court informed defendant of what had happened, then said it was going 
forward with trial. R. 344:15-16. Mr. Martinez asked for new counsel and the court 
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responded that it had already denied that motion for no basis. R. 344:17. Mr. Martinez 
asserted that there were new issues that day which justified the motion. R. 344:17-18. 
Mr. Martinez, himself, asserted his claim: 
My lawyers, they feel intimidated by me, so, therefore, we have a conflict of 
interest. So therefore, they feel they are afraid of me or whatever their 
complaints would be. So, therefore, there's a conflict between me and the 
lawyers. So, therefore, I don't see how we can, you know, communicate without 
me feeling that there's a fear between me and them. 
R. 344:23. The fact that Mr. Martinez had regular communication with counsel 
previously, was at court when his motion to sever was denied, withdrew his 
substitution request, and stared-down the court does nothing to rebut defendant's two 
arguments: that the court failed to fully inquire into the nature of the current conflict 
and that his ability to adequately communicate with his counsel was presently 
compromised. In short, defendant does not see how a failure to discuss the 
applicability of issues not relevant to his argument—nonetheless issues he properly 
cited and articulated in his brief—somehow relates to a failure to marshal. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT INADEQUATELY INQUIRED 
INTO THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT 
The State contends that the trial court adequately inquired into the nature of 
the conflict. Aplt's Br. at 38. As support for this proposition, it cites the court's pretrial 
decision and a prior day's discussion on a completely different issue as "illustrative of 
the court's willingness to fairly consider Defendant's complaint." Aplt's Br. at 35. 
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However, none of these examples has any relevance to the adequacy of the mid-trial 
inquiry, which Mr. Martinez contends was merely perfunctory. 
In support of the adequacy of the mid-trial inquiry, the State argues that the 
court adequately apprised itself of the intimidation through discussions with counsel, 
the defendant, and Judge Hilder. Aplt's Br. at 36-38. To the State, the court only had 
the obligation to determine whether the attorneys had "divided loyalties that actually 
affected their performance" and that Mr. Martinez's actions were irrelevant to this 
analysis. Aplt's Br. at 38. 
At no point does the State argue that the court conducted a thorough analysis 
of whether an actual conflict of interest existed. In fact, it acknowledges that "[w]hen 
Defendant re-raised the same complaint midtrial, the court did summarily reject it. 
But by that point, the court already knew the complaint was unfounded ...." Aplt's Br. 
at 27. However, at no point did the court engage in any sort of meaningful 
questioning. 
As cited in the State's brief, "[w]hen a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with 
counsel, a trial court 'must make some reasonable, non-suggestive ejforts to determine 
the nature of the defendant's complaints;" State v. Lovell 1999 UT 40, f 27, 984 P.2d 
382, citing State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added). 
When the defendant alleges dissatisfaction with trial counsel, 
the court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the 
nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary 
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to determine whether the defendant's relationship with his or her appointed 
attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution or even to such an extent that his or her Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel would be violated but for substitution. Even when the trial judge 
suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous and designed solely to 
manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory questioning is 
not sufficient. 
Pursifelly 746 P.2d at 273 (emphasis added). 
The following bullet points quickly summarize the court's inquiry, and is 
merely just another way of restating the information already summarized. 
• The court summarized defense counsel's interactions with Judge Hilder 
the prior evening and defense counsel agreed with the summary. R. 344:6 
• In response to defense counsel's complaint of their "ability to continue to 
adequately and zealously represent Mr. Martinez in trial," the court told 
them that it was their "duty" to do so, then stated that Mr. Martinez's 
intimidation led counsel to act against their professional judgment. R. 
344:7. Defense counsel agreed with the statement. Id. 
• The court noted a previous case in which similar complaints were raised 
after trial, "not in the heat of the battle" and asked whether it should be 
similar in this case, if the State should have "a chance to noodle" the 
question. R. 344:8. 
• The State asked to investigate claims of actual threats. R. 344:8. The court 
told the State that that issue was "not the point." R. 344:8. 
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• The court told defense counsel that if future intimidation occurred to 
"call... bullshit. ... Right?" R. 344:9. 
• The court discussed what it was going to tell Ms. Shreve about improper 
impeachment, saying that the mistakes were "water under the bridge." R. • 
344:10. 
• The court let both sides discuss the issue and took a five-minute recess. £ 
R. 344:11-12. 
• The prosecutor told the court that after speaking with defense counsel, 
defense counsel would "represent [ Mr. Martinez] with the integrity of 
court officers and do their job like they should." R. 344:11. 
t 
• The court lectured Ms. Shreve about the impropriety of the 
impeachment the previous evening. R. 344:12. 
i 
• Mr. Tan expressed concerns about zealously representing Mr. Martinez 
stating that he could not disclose the bases of the intimidation. R. 344:13. 
• The court said that Mr. Tan would have to disclose the intimidation at a * 
minimum. R. 344:13. 
• Mr. Tan discussed his obligations to the court, the well being of his client | 
and Ms. Shreve said that she wanted to go forward since the "State is 
going to help me out." R. 344:13. 
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• The court brought out Mr. Martinez and told him about the previous 
night's ruling, then disclosed the intimidation. R. 344:14-15. 
• The court mentioned that counsel "whether rightfully or wrongfully" felt 
intimidated. R. 344:15. It cited the improper impeachment, saying that "I 
don't know if that's a fair example or not." R. 344:15-16. The court then 
said it was going forward with the trial. R. 344:16. 
• The defendant admitted the court was right about the previous night's 
ruling, then the court told him about ineffective assistance and stated 
that he "had never taken your concerns lightly." R. 344:16-17. 
• Mr. Martinez said he wanted new counsel and the court denied it 
reasoning the issue had already been litigated. R. 344:17. 
• The defendant claimed that new issues came up that day and iterated 
many of his complaints. R. 344:17-18. 
• The court warned the defendant about disclosing information in 
violation of the attorney client privilege. R. 344:18. 
• The court told Mr. Martinez that he would not get counsel of his choice 
and that the issue had already been decided: "it's not possible to just 
bring in two new lawyers in the middle of a trial. It may be that you use it 
as an argument for some appeal...." R. 344:19. It then asked counsel 
about their office's conflict procedures. R. 344:19. 
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• Defense counsel disputed the allegation that they weren't moving to 
sever the case. R. 344:19. The court said that "[w]e don't need to go into 
that" since it "may or may not be the basis for an appropriate motion in 
the future where there's new counsel." R. 344:20. 
• The court then told defendant about a prior murder case where there is 
"a process to work through" and reiterated it would treat Mr. Martinez 
with respect. R. 344:21. 
• Mr. Martinez said he didn't agree with what the court was doing, the 
court said it thought it was making the legally appropriate ruling, and 
asked for the next witness. R. 344:21. 
• The court asked Defendant what he wanted. After expressing some 
concerns about officers talking in the hallways, defendant asked for new 
counsel and for a new trial. R. 344:22. 
• The court said the matter was already denied and asked if Mr. Martinez 
looked for new counsel now. R. 344:23. The defendant said he was 
because of the new conflict of interest involving intimidation. R. 344:23. 
• The court asked both counsel if they could "vigorously represent" Mr. 
Martinez. Both said they could. R. 344:23-24. 
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• The court said that he did not know if the intimidation was "the result of 
your own conduct" but that he would not allow Mr. Martinez to 
manipulate it so he gets new counsel. R. 344:24. 
• The court asked Mr. Martinez for specific reasons and he argued many 
of his pretrial issues. R. 344:24-27. 
• The court denied the motion, which was followed by the stare-down 
episode. R. 344:27-28. 
This restatement illustrates several key points. First, as articulated in his 
opening brief, the court never inquired into the substance of the conflict. The court 
only disclosed that there was alleged intimidation, but it made no effort to determine 
the extent of the intimidation that counsel felt. Counsel indicated on multiple 
occasions in the same hearing that they had serious reservations about their ability to 
adequately represent Mr. Martinez. Other than to ask, at the very end, whether they 
could continue to adequately represent Mr. Martinez, the court made no efforts to 
discover the extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication. Defense counsel 
made two polar opposite claims: they declared that they would be unable to zealously 
represent Mr. Martinez, and they also said that they could. R. 344:7,13, 23-24. Yet, in 
between those two claims, the court did nothing to discover the nature or extent of 
these fears. 
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One indicator of the court's lack of understanding of the conflict involved the 
improper impeachment. The court claimed the impeachment might have been a poor 
strategic decision counsel alleged they had had to make. But the court admitted that it 
might not have been "a fair example" of a poor strategic decision. R. 344:15-16. This 
comment illustrates the court's naivete about the extent of the conflict—it had no idea 
whether this was a poor strategic decision defense counsel made. The court only 
assumed it was. At no point did counsel disclose this as a poor decision. In other 
words, at the point when it ruled on the motion, having done all its questioning, the 
court knew nothing about the alleged conflict other than the defendant had allegedly 
intimidated counsel. It speculated about everything else. 
In addition, the court unfairly expected Mr. Martinez to determine the extent 
of a conflict about which he had just been informed and about which he had little to 
no information. He was not in a position to evaluate the fears of his attorneys nor the 
basis for these fears. He was just informed by the court that the conflict existed. He 
complained, naturally, about his counsel, but the court expected him to give specific 
reasons why this new conflict, about which he knew little to nothing, was different 
from the old ones. Nonetheless, Mr. Martinez maintained the conflict was new and 
involved his ability to communicate with his attorneys, now that they feared him. 
Finally, the court seems to have misunderstood the nature of how these claims 
can be litigated. It referred on multiple occasions that these matters would more 
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properly be resolved post-trial and that this matter had already been litigated. R. 344:8, 
17, 19-20, 21, 23. This constitutes a misunderstanding of conflicts that can arise during 
trial While true that the issue had been decided pretrial, Mr. Martinez's attorneys 
disclosed strong sentiments mid-trial that they claimed, not only caused them to make 
poor strategic decisions, but affected their ability to zealously represent him. When 
faced with such evidence, a trial court has the ability to appoint conflict counsel. See 
State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (defendant must show good 
cause for rejecting court-appointed counsel). It might result in a delay, even a 
substantial one, but nothing in the law requires these concerns only to be raised post-
trial, as the court repeatedly suggested. The State admits this would have been the 
appropriate remedy: "mistrial would have been mandated if an actual conflict existed." 
Aple's Br. at 48.2 Ruling on a pretrial substitution motion in no way eliminates the 
possibility that new conflicts of interest can arise mid-trial. 
When faced with new claims, the court has an obligation to "make some 
reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant's 
complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the 
defendant's relationship with his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated ..." 
2
 The State contends that mistrial was not warranted since "no actual conflict was 
established ..." Aple's Br. at 48. 
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Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 273. At no point did the court "apprise itself of the facts" it 
needed to determine the extent, and/or nature of the conflict. 
Ill, EVIDENCE OF AN ACTUAL CONFLICT EXISTS 
The State alleges that Mr. Martinez failed to establish an actual conflict, and as 
such, his claim fails. Aple's Br. at 38. However, none of the State's arguments in 
rebuttal negate the direct evidence of a conflict—defense counsels' statements that 
they would have difficulty zealously representing Mr. Martinez. 
First, the State alleges that no conflict existed because Mr. Martinez threatened 
his attorneys. Aple's Br. at 39. Defendant did not allege, nor does the record support, 
conclusion that he actually threatened his attorneys. In fact, the court made no such 
finding. The court only heard from defense counsel, who indicated they felt 
threatened by him, but Mr. Martinez never admitted to this conduct. As discussed in 
Section II, infra, the court failed to adequately inquire into this matter. At most, Mr. 
Martinez asked counsel to file a frivolous motion to suppress, which is hardly a basis 
to claim that he caused his attorneys to feel threatened. See Aple's Br. at 40. 
The State makes much of the fact that the defendant was difficult with the 
court. Aple's Br. at 40. However, defendant's actions with the court cannot be a basis 
for claiming that he was the cause of a conflict with his counsel. The court made no 
such finding, nor is it justified by anything in the record. The State, in essence, wants 
this Court to find that someone who argues with the judge must also have caused a 
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conflict with, or threatened his lawyers. Again, the nature of the conflict with Mr. 
Martinez's counsel is largely unknown, in part because it is based on counsels' non-
disclosure and limited statement that they felt threatened. 
The State also claims that since Mr. Martinez's attorneys "actively represent[ed] 
him," he lacks a basis to show a conflict. Aple's Br. at 40. However, this statement 
neglects to consider that defense counsel admitted they had difficulties zealously 
representing Mr. Martinez. R. 344:7,13. They also admitted that the intimidation had 
caused them to act against their professional judgment. R. 344:7. However, the record 
does not support what these actions were. While the State claims this amounted to a 
single improper impeachment that arguably benefitted the defendant, the record does 
not support such an assertion. As discussed previously, the court did not determine 
what these improper decisions were, so one cannot speculate to their substance. 
However, the decisions clearly impacted counsels' approach to the case, as they 
admitted. Only after guarantees of State protection did defense counsel feel like they 
could go forward. R. 344:13, 137. 
Defendant claimed several examples of what appears from the record to be 
events that compromised defense counsels' ability to zealously represent Mr. 
Martinez. Aplt's Br. at 29-31. The State contends that although Shreve was "followed 
home the first night of trial" and did not report this to the court, she "did not let the 
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incident impact her willingness to proceed with Defendant's trial." Aple's Br. at 41. 
Unfortunately, we no little, to nothing of what occurred, less Ms. Shreve's fears. 
When the court disclosed this matter to Mr. Tan and the State, the prosecutor 
felt the matter was serious enough to merit full disclosure and a criminal investigation. 
R. 360:4. The record demonstrates little of Ms. Shreve's feelings, other than a few key 
facts. Ms. Shreve was followed home after trial on the first day, and she reported the 
matter to police. R. 360:3-4. Ms. Shreve came late to court on the second day, and had 
a conversation with the prosecutor, who apparently promised to protect her from Mr. 
Martinez. R. 344:11 (prosecutor "talked with [defense counsel] about some safety 
measures that we could take to perhaps help alleviate any concerns they might have"); 
344:13 (Ms. Shreve told the court that "[w]e're worried. I'm okay. Let's go. The State is 
going to help me out.); 344:137 (Ms. Shreve told the court that "after sleeping on it, 
waking up this morning with some additional security that I felt like I am comfortable 
to go forward and advocate for my client and not allow this [to] affect my ability to 
represent him."). While Ms. Shreve did formally indicate that she could zealously 
represent Mr. Martinez, this was only after the State agreed to "help [her] out" and 
protect her from Mr. Martinez. Id.; 344:24. An attorney who labors in fear of her 
client, and who needs State protection to ensure she feels ok, clearly has a 
compromised ability to represent the client. 
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Perhaps the biggest problem with Ms. Shreve's representation of Mr. Martinez 
was that she apparently feared Mr. Martinez was connected to the following-home 
episode and had called the police about it. An attorney would have a difficult time 
zealously representing a client against whom she has called the police. Granted, Ms. 
Shreve did not call the police on Mr. Martinez, but she feared his connection to the 
following-home episode enough that she needed the State's protection to go forward 
and try the case. 
The State also asserts defense counsels' fear that they could not zealously 
represent Mr. Martinez was repudiated "upon further reflection." Aple's Br. at 42. 
However, as discussed infra, defense counsel made two such statements—they worried 
about their ability to be zealous—in the same hearing, and mere minutes before the 
subsequent repudiation when the defendant was present in court. See Section II, infra. 
The State's contention that the repudiation happened a day later fails to take into 
account that two contradictory statements were made in the same hearing. 
The post-verdict motion to withdraw, may, as the State asserts, be asserted to 
allege an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which is what happened in this case. 
Aple's Br. at 42. However, just because a withdrawl may happen to allege ineffective 
assistance, it does not mean that the withdrawl may not be evidence of an actual 
conflict of interest. Clearly, if counsel had an actual conflict of interest, they would be 
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obligated to withdraw. So the withdrawl might be the best indication of an actual 
conflict, as argued in Defendant's opening brief. 
Finally, the State argues that defense counsel's tactic of admitting guilt was a 
trial strategy calculated to reduce Mr. Martinez's potential sentence. Aple's Br. at 43- • 
46. Defense counsel asked the jury to find Mr. Martinez guilty of every offense 
charged, with the exception of a reduction from Attempted Murder to Aggravated 4 
Assault. R. 345:24-27. 
The State argues that it is "well-recognized that an attorney who actively 
advocates for a defendant during trial may choose to concede some guilt in closing 
argument, if in doing so, the defense gains credibility or other strategic advantage." 
4 
Aple's Br. at 44. This, however, is not the entire state of law, since defense counsel may 
not concede guilt without his client's consent, except in limited situations. 
The decision of whether to plead guilty rests with the defendant, and not with ' 
his counsel. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987, 103 S. Ct. 3308 
(1983) ("the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions < 
regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty . . ."). Recently, commentators have 
been uniformly calling for courts to require defendants to make these concessions of 
guilt, rather than counsel.3 
3
 Heidi H. Woessner, Criminal Law-The Crucible of Adversarial Testing: 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Unauthorized Concessions of Client's Guilt, 24 W. 
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Many courts have held that defense counsel may not waive this right for his 
client without his consent. See State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507-08 (N.C. 1985), 
cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1123, 90 L. Ed. 2d 672, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986) (per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel "has been established in every criminal case in which the 
defendant's counsel admits the defendant's guilt to the jury without the defendant's 
consent."); Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1979) (defense attorney 
cannot stipulate to a defendant's prior convictions for purposes of a habitual offender 
enhancement without the defendant's consent); People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513, 519 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 315, 348 (2002) (arguing that defendants should hold the right to 
concede guilt, not their counsel); Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon's Shadow: The 
Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 363, 397 (2003) ("when counsel overrides a defendants decisions regarding 
how the defendant wishes to exercise his personal constitutional rights, counsel has 
ceased to function as his clients advocate"); Robert J. Nolan, Prejudice Presumed: The 
Decision to Concede Guilt to Lesser Offenses During Opening Statements, 55 HASTINGS 
LJ. 965, 985 (2004) ("When defense counsel concedes guilt during opening 
statements, however, she completely relieves the prosecution of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Moreover, defense counsel takes the decision about the defendant's 
guilt as to the lesser-included offense out of the hands of the jury by effectively 
entering an unauthorized guilty plea as to the lesser-included offense on behalf of the 
defendant. In such cases, a presumption of prejudice is warranted ..."); Sharon G. 
Scudder, With Friends Like You, Who Needs a fury? A Response to the Legitimization 
of Conceding a Client's Guilt, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 137,179 (2006) ("In the cases in 
which concession of guilt is part of a strategy, the defendant must have the final 
decision whether to pursue this strategy for the same well-established reasons he must 
decide as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will 
testify. Allowing an attorney to relinquish his role as a zealous advocate and concede a 
client's guilt without his consent is damaging to the profession and the criminal justice 
system.") 
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(111. 1986) ("Counsel may not concede his client's guilt in the hope of obtaining a more 
lenient sentence where a plea of not guilty has been entered, unless the record 
adequately shows that defendant knowingly and intelligently consented to his 
counsel's strategy."); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (Kan. 2000) (defense counsel • 
may not concede guilt, and counsel's concession, without client's consent constituted 
a "breakdown in our adversarial system of justice" warranting no separate showing of ^ 
prejudice); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 1990) ("defendant was denied a 
fair trial and effective assistance of counsel entitling him to a new trial when his 
i 
attorney conceded, without defendant's permission, that defendant was guilty of heat -
of-passion manslaughter"); State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Minn. 1984) ("if 
a defense counsel impliedly admits a defendant's guilt without the defendant's 
permission or acquiescence, the defendant should be given a new trial even if it can be 
said that the defendant would have been convicted in any event."); Jones v. State, 877 ' 
P.2d 1052,1059 (Nev. 1994) (defense counsel "undermined his client's testimonial 
disavowal of guilt during the guilt phase of the trial," which warranted a reversal). j 
Defense counsel has options, even in a case like this one in which there is little 
controvertible evidence. "In every criminal case, a defense attorney can, at the very 
least, hold the State to its burden of proof by clearly articulating to the jury or fact-
finder that the State must establish each element of the crime charged and that a 
i 
conviction can only be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Nixon v. 
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Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618,625 (Fla. 2000). Defense counsel did not have to concede 
guilt, nor could he without his client's consent. He could have merely informed the 
jury of the State's burden and the elements they have the obligation to prove. 
Defendant does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel under a Strickland 
standard, rather he asserts that, as previously argued, defense counsel's failure to act as 
a meaningful advocate, and to concede Mr. Martinez's guilt on all of the offenses, 
(albeit with a recommendation of a lesser-included on the most serious offense) 
constitutes significant evidence of the existence of an actual conflict of interest. It 
shows how counsel, although they might have said otherwise, did not zealously 
represent Mr. Martinez by making the State prove all of its claims beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Counsel conceded guilt without Mr. Martinez's consent—a clear indication of 
the lack counsel's lack of zeal. Counsel clearly advocated for Mr. Martinez, but did not 
represent him to the fullest. 
The State's arguments regarding the lack of harm to Mr. Martinez are 
inapplicable to the case at hand, since because there was an actual conflict of interest, 
he has shown good cause for substitution of counsel. See Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 382 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997); Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 272. 
In short, none of the State's arguments effectively rebut the claims that defense 
counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly 
and fully inquire into the nature of the conflict between Mr. Martinez and his counsel 
and that his counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest and as such, he is 
entitled to a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3° day of KJovg^g^- 2011. 
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